ANTITRUST LAW-THE NONSTATUTORY LABOR EXEMPTION FROM
ANTITRUST LIABILrrY CONTINUES TO AFFORD PROTECTION TO A
MULTIEMPLOYER BARGAINING UNIT EVEN AFFER A PAST
AGREEMENT ENDS, AND THE ENTITY RETAINS THE DUTY TO
BARGAIN ONCE A GOOD FAITH IMPASSE IS REACHED IN CONTRACT

NEGOTIATIONS-Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.,

116 S. Ct. 2116

(1996).
The enigmatic relationship between federal antitrust and labor laws1
has evolved to ensure that the two may co-exist and properly function despite their inherently inconsistent principles. 2 The Sherman Antitrust
Act, 3 enacted in 1890, was designed to promote competition and regulate
commercial activity. 4 To determine if an antitrust law has been violated,
1 See Theodore J. St. Antoine, Connell: Antitrust Law at the Expense of Labor Law,

62 VA. L. REV. 603, 604-05 (1976). See generally Martin I. Kaminsky, The Antitrust
Labor Exemption: An Employer Perspective, 16 SEON HALL L. REv. 4 (1986)
(discussing the problematic and unsettled relationship between the two distinct areas of
law and concluding that while antitrust exemptions protect good faith employer conduct,
the standards of liability are still confusing and hardly give adequate guidance to predict
future action).
2 See Sun-Land Nurseries, Inc. v. Southern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 769
F.2d 1381, 1386 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that antitrust and labor laws "do not have identical objectives"); E. THOMAS SULVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW,
PoucY AND PRoCEDURE 937 (3d ed. 1994); ARcHIBALD COx ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALs ON LABOR LAW 871-72 (9th ed. 1981).
3 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1992). The Sherman Act was the result of the tenuous
socio-political and economic atmosphere between 1865 and 1890. See WILLIAm LETWIN,
LAw AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMmICA: THE EvOLUIrON OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST
AcT 15-18 (1965). The Act encouraged freedom of trade and was founded on English
common law principles. See id. On its face, and in its application, there has been dispute
over Congress's goals in enacting the Sherman Act. See Robert H. Lande, Wealth
Transfers as the Originaland Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation
Challenged, 34 HASTINoS LJ. 65, 106 (1982). General agreement exists that Congress
intended to encourage competition by regulating firms or industries with significant market power because they could artificially raise prices and restrict output. See id. Congress wanted an efficient and productive economy that would curtail the social and political power of large corporations and enable smaller entrepreneurs to enter new markets.
See id.
4 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 635
(1985). See also Northern Pacific Railroad v. United States, which stated:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of
trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the
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courts apply one of two distinct standards.5 Certain business activities
are labeled as either a per se restraint of trade or the situation is analowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while
at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of
our democratic political and social institutions.
366 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).

Section one of the Sherman Act provides, in pertinent part, that "[elvery contract,
combination... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States... is declared to be illegal ....
Every person who shall make any contract or
engage in any combination or conspiracy declared ... to be illegal shall be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor. ...

" 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1992).

Additionally, section two provides that

"[elvery person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce... shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be
punished by fine ... or by imprisonment .... " Id. § 2.
When the Supreme Court first interpreted the Sherman Act, it condemned every restraint on trade or commerce, without exception, as unlawful. See United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 341 (1897) (inquiring, the Court simply
asked: "Does the agreement restrain trade or commerce in any way so as to be a violation of the [A]ct?"). Such a literal reading of this section would prohibit numerous necessary and valid business activities and objectives. See LAWRENCE ANTHONY SULUVAN,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTTRUST § 63, at 165 (1977) (noting that every contract inevitably restrains trade to some extent).
One year after deciding Trans-Missouri, the Court reconsidered its strict reasoning
and concluded that its initial interpretation of section one was too inclusive. See United
States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 568 (1898). Justice Peckham held:
[The statute applies only to those contracts whose direct and immediate effect is a restraint upon interstate commerce, and that to treat the act as
condemning all agreements... would enlarge the application of the act far
beyond the fair meaning of the language used ....
An agreement entered
into for the purpose of promoting the legitimate business of an individual
or corporation, with no purpose to thereby affect or restrain interstate
commerce, and which does not directly restrain such commerce, is not, as

we think, covered by the act, although the agreement may indirectly and
remotely affect that commerce.
Id. (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court continued to interpret section one of the Sherman Act to forbid
only unreasonable restraints of trade. See Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S.
231, 238 (1918) (concluding that an imposed restraint is legal if it merely regulates and
promotes competition as opposed to suppressing and possibly destroying competition);
see aLso Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1911) (interpreting the
congressional intent to pertain to unreasonable restraints). To determine the reasonableness of a particular restraint, courts must make an extensive inquiry into the nature, purpose, and effect of the restraint. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 67. In Board of Trade,
the Supreme Court considered several factors including "the facts peculiar to the business
to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed;
the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable." Boardof Trade, 246 U.S. at
238. Additionally, courts should analyze the history of an industry, the rationale and reason for imposing a restraint, and the goal that is sought to be attained. See id.
6 See SULUIVAN, supra note 4,
§ 63, at 166.
6 See id. The Supreme Court stated that "certain
agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as
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lyzed pursuant to the Rule of Reason. 7 The underlying policies of Labor
Law, however, directly contrast with antitrust principles.8 For this reato the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use." Northern
Pac. Ry., 365 U.S. at 5. As to specific price-fixing agreements, the Supreme Court
summarily disregards any reasonableness arguments. See Addyston Pipe and Steel Co.
v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 237-38 (1899) (labeling the issue of reasonableness as
unimportant because common law courts did not entertain any inquiries into the reasonableness of such contracts). In United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., for example, a
case involving a price-fixing agreement among 20 individuals and 23 corporations that
manufactured and distributed bathroom accessories, the Court promulgated:
The reasonable price fixed today may through economic and business
changes become the unreasonable price of tomorrow. Once established, it
may be maintained unchanged because of the absence of competition ....
Agreements which create such potential power may well be held to be in
themselves unreasonable or unlawful restraints, without the necessity of
minute inquiry [into] whether a particular price is reasonable or unreasonable as fixed ....
273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927).
Other cases have also demonstrated specific practices that have been labeled per se
violations of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457
U.S. 332, 344 (1982) (clarifying that past experience with a specific restraint enables the
Court to presume that the restraint is unacceptable); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959) (reiterating that group boycotts are per se illegal);
Paramount Famous Lansky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30, 43 (1930) (declaring a
per se violation if parties maintain outright refusal to deal).
The per se rule, however, has been limited in its application because of the substantial risk that legitimate, pro-competitive activities will be declared illegal. See Bradley S.
Albert & Brian K. Albert, Fourth and Goal: It's Time for Congress to Tackle the Nonstatutory Labor Exemption, 2 SPORTs LAW. J. 185, 193 (1995). For that reason, the per
se rule is usually only invoked in limited circumstances. See Continental Tel., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977) (finding that conduct must be manifestly anticompetitive before the per se rule applies); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S.
253' 263 (1963) (deeming certain business activities a naked restraint of trade).
See Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at 49-62. The Rule of Reason demands that a
court analyze the reasonableness of a challenged restraint on trade. See Ethan Lock, The
Scope of the Labor Exemption in ProfessionalSports, 1989 DuKE LJ. 339, 344 (1989).
To determine unreasonableness, courts first look at the purpose and effect of the imposed
restraint. See National Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692
(1978). Citing Standard Oil, the National Society Court viewed the nature, character, or
circumstances of either a contract or an act to infer an intentional trade restraint. See id.
at 690. In addition, the Court stated that:
[Tihe inquiry mandated by the Rule of Reason is whether the challenged
agreement is one that promotes competition or one that suppresses compe-

tition. 'The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is
such as may suppress or even destroy competition.'
Id. at 691 (quoting Board of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238).
The Rule of Reason also requires a court to balance the pro-competitive and anticompetitive effects of a restraint. See, e.g., Board of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238. In Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, the Supreme Court went as far as to uphold a pricefixing agreement under the Rule of Reason because of the deplorable economic conditions
in the coal industry. See 288 U.S. 344, 361 (1933). In essence, the Rule of Reason
grants broad discretion to courts for weighing various aspects of competitive markets be-
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son, two separate labor exemptions-one statutorily imposed 9 and one
judicially impliedlO-have been enacted and incorporated to protect labor
fore deciding whether an agreement violates antitrust laws. See E. THOMAS SULIVAN &
JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDINO ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 8386 (2d ed. 1994).
See Kieran M. Corcoran, Note, When Does the Buzzer Sound?: The Nonstatutory
Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1045, 1048 (1994). Specifically, unions, the threat of strikes, and the process of good faith collective bargaining
over issues that may restrain an employee's mobility can effectively preclude an employer
from productively bargaining with its employees. See JOHN C. WEiSTART & CYM H.
LOWEL, THE LAW OF SPORTS 528 (1979). In these types of circumstances, the enforce-

ment of antitrust law would severely hinder the process of collective bargaining, which
would effectively negate the original purpose of establishing such a principle. See Albert
& Albert, supra note 6, at 195. Not surprisingly, initial joint activities by workers were
prosecuted as conspiracies. See Kaminsky, supra note 1, at 7.
9 See Kaminsky, supra note 1, at 8-15; see also LMERTY AND JUsTICE:
A HISTORiCAL RECORD OF AMERICAN CONSTITtIONAL DEvEOPMENT 314 (. Smith & P. Murphy eds., 1958) (detailing historical review of the development of American labor law).
The statutory labor exemption originated with the Clayton Act. See Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1994); 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (1994). Section six of the Clayton Act
states that labor is not an article or commodity of commerce and that antitrust laws do not
prohibit labor unions or organizations. See 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1988). In addition, section
20 of the Clayton Act limits the power and discretion of courts to grant injunctions in labor disputes. See 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1988). The Supreme Court enunciated:
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with nonlabor groups, the licit and the illicit under [section] 20 are not to be distinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness
or wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of the end of which the particular union activities are the means.
United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941). The application of the Clayton
Act, however, was slow. See, e.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443,
477-78 (1921) (issuing broad injunctions against organized labor).
Accordingly, Congress then enacted the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, which established a favorable policy for organized labor, collective bargaining, and expanded
protection for union activities. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1988). The Clayton Act and
Norris-LaGuardia Act jointly created the initial statutory exemption. See Corcoran, supra
note 8, at 1049-50. Because unions assume the vital role of improving a worker's wages,
working conditions, and hours by consolidating the supply of labor, their existence would
be tenuous without such an antitrust exemption. See Daniel J. Gifford, Redefining the
Antitrust Labor Exemption, 72 MwIN. L. REv. 1379, 1400-02 (1988). Neither the Clayton Act nor the Norris-LaGuardia Act, however, explicitly guided courts on how to deal
with complex collective bargaining problems. See SULLIVAN, supra note 4, § 237, at
723. To reinforce its commitment to the collective bargaining process, Congress enacted
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) in 1947. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988). In
essence, this Act and its companion, the Labor Management Relations Act, see 29 U.S.C.
§§ 141-97 (1988), promote the federal interest in collective bargaining by correcting the
unequal bargaining power between employers and employees. See Corcoran, supra note
8, at 1050.
10 See SULLIvAN & HOvENKAhP, supra note 2, at 961. This is a limited, judiciallycontrived antitrust exemption that specifically addresses employer-union agreements because the statutory exemption only applied to unilateral acts of unions. See id. The nonstatutory exemption is a safeguard for employers in their negotiations with unions concerning collective bargaining agreements. See Bradley Roscoe Cahoon, Note, Powell v.
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policies from antitrust liability" The professional sports industry poses
an interesting dilemma to courts12 because major league baseball has been
deemed an express exception to antitrust laws,13 while other specific bargaining processes enjoy the nonstatutory exemption.1 4 The nonstatutory
exemption's scope, however, is still somewhat ambiguous. 15 Specifically
National Football League: Modified Impasse Standard Determines Scope of Labor Exemption, 1990 UTAH L. REV. 381, 387 (1990). For a more detailed and historical analysis of the relevant case law pertaining to the nonstatutory labor exemption, see infra notes
39-59 and accompanying text.
11 See SuLLIVA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 960-63.
12 See Albert & Albert, supra note 6, at 199. "The industry as a whole is unique from
other industries. See id. This can be attributed, but not limited to, the inherently unequal
bargaining power between labor and management, the monopolization of the labor force
and product market, the instability of union membership due to the extremely high turnover rate, and uncommon interests among players. See id.; see also Lock, supra note 7,
at 354-59 (tracing the specific history of collective bargaining labor disputes in die National Football League). In addition, die individual teams that comprise a league are financially independent and do not necessarily compete economically with one another,
which makes professional sports somewhat of an anomaly. See Shawn Treadwell, Note,
An Examination of the Nonstatutory Labor Exemption from the Antitrust Laws, in the

Context of Professional Sports, 23 FoRDHAm URB. LJ. 955, 962 (1996) (citing United
States v. National Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319, 323 (E.D. Pa. 1953)).
13 See Federal Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League, 259 U.S. 200,- 209 (1922)
(holding that professional baseball was not subject to the Sherman Act because the activity was not considered trade or commerce in the ordinary sense of the word). As a result, professional baseball, as opposed to other sports, was specifically exempted from
antitrust liability. See Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 449-52
(1957). Although this exemption was established on a tenuous foundation, see Su.LvAH
& HovENKAM, supra note 2, at 969, the Supreme Court continues to honor its validity.
See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972) (recognizing baseball's antitrust exception
as a judicial aberration which is not founded on labor law but, rather, stare decisis).
Additionally, in 1961 Congress impliedly approved of the exemption by observing that
nothing in a new sports-broadcasting law would affect the applicability or nonapplicability of antitrust laws to baseball, football, basketball, or hockey. See SuIzvAH
& HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 969. Other than baseball, though, no other sport receives this exemption on an industry-wide basis. See Radovich, 352 U.S. at 452. See
generally Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971) (upholding injunctions issued against that professional basketball league).
14 See Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976)
(discussing the nonstatutory exemption when an agreement was genuinely reached

through good faith, arm's-length bargaining).

See Albert & Albert, supra note 6, at 197-98. The nonstatutory exemption, or the
circumstances for when it can be imposed, has not been clearly set forth by the Supreme
Court. See id. at 198. The existing case law that has helped evolve the application is
limited and ambiguous. See id. at 197 (citing United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381
U.S. 657, 668 (1965)) (denying the exemption because a union-employer wage control
conspiracy was not within the bargaining objectives); Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689-90 (1965) (permitting the ex-

emption because bona fide arm's-length bargaining was in furtherance of union policies)).
The Supreme Court, however, has explicitly stated that a collective bargaining relationship must exist for the nonstatutory exemption to apply. See Connell Constr. Co. v.
Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 635 (1975).
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at issue is the unanswered question of when, or if, the nonstatutory ex16
emption terminates once a collective bargaining agreement1 7expires.
Four separate theories have been established by various courts.
Due to the uncertainty in this area, the United States Supreme Court
recently examined the nonstatutory labor exemption's applicability as it
relates to collective bargainin within the sports industry when it decided
The Court considered whether a multiBrown v. Pro Football, Inc.
employer bargaining unit's unilateral imposition of a fixed salary upon
certain athletes violated antitrust or labor laws.19 Considering several
different factors, the Supreme Court held that the players' lawsuit was
barred by the nonstatutory exemption even though a past agreement had
ended. 20 Thus, the Supreme 21Court concluded that the owners were
shielded from antitrust liability.
In Brown, a labor dispute arose in 1989 between the National Football League Pl2yer's Association (NFLPA) and the National Football
League (NFL). The two entities previously had operated together pur-

16 See Treadwell, supra note 12, at 966; see also Note, Releasing Superstarsfrom
Peonage: Union Consent and the Nonstatutory Labor Exemption, 104 HARV. L. REV.
874, 888-94 (1991) (arguing that the union must consent for the exemption to continue to
exist beyond an agreement's expiration).
17 See National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069, 1074-76 (S.D.N.Y.
1994). The first theory is a reasonable expectation standard, which allows the exemption
to survive if the employer imposes a past restraint upon impasse founded on the reasonable belief it will similarly be included in the next agreement. See Bridgeman v. National
Basketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960, 967 (D.NJ. 1987). A second theory is that the ex-

emption lasts only until an impasse in negotiations is reached.

See Powell v. National

Football League, 678 F. Supp. 777, 788 (D. Minn. 1988). A third possibility, enunciated
by the Eighth Circuit upon Powell's appeal, extended the exemption to last beyond impasse, so long as the bargaining relationship continued to exist and each side was capable
of reaching an accord before and after the impasse. See Powell v. National Football
League, 888 F.2d 559, 568 (8th Cir. 1989). The fourth theory held that the labor exemption expired simultaneously with the end of any collective bargaining agreement. See
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 125, 132 (D.D.C. 1991), rev'd 50 F.3d 1041,
1058 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
is 116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996).
19 See id.at 2119.
20 See id. at 2127. The Court focused its analysis on four primary factors to determine ifthe exemption still existed: (1) the employer conduct occurred during and immediately after collective bargaining; (2) the exemption arose from and was related to lawful
bargaining; (3)the two sides were obligated to negotiate collectively; and (4) the matter
only concerned the parties involved in the collective bargaining. See id.
See id.
22 See Brown, 782 F. Supp. at 127. The NFLPA is a recognized labor organization
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1994) and retains exclusive bargaining power for every
National Football League player. See Brown, 782 F. Supp. at 129 (citing 29 U.S.C. §
159(a) (1994)). At the time of this labor dispute, Eugene Upshaw was the acting representative of the NFLPA. See id. at 127. Additionally, when this suit commenced, the
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suant to a collective bargaining agreement, but that contract had expired.2 Contention between the two parties developed when the NFL
attempted to establish fixed salaries of one thousand dollars per week for
developmental squad players.2 The NFLPA rejected the NFL's resolution as a restraint of trade and demanded that all players retain the right
to negotiate their individual salaries. 25 Notwithstanding the union's opposition,2 the NFL's Commissioner sent a memorandum to each NFL
team that commanded teams to adhere to the aforementioned salary and
warned of possible repercussions for noncompliance. 27 After the teams
instituted the required compensation,
developmental player Antony
Brown 2s challenged the NFL's attempted "salary cap," arguing that it
encompassed an illegal price-fixing scheme that violated section one of
NFL consisted of 28 teams, and the Executive Director of the NFL Management Council
was Jack Donlan. See id.
23 See id. at 129. The NFL and NFLPA originally entered into a
collective bargaining agreement in 1977. See id. That agreement expired in 1982 and the parties subsequently agreed to a new one, which terminated in 1987. See id. While a new accord was
not consummated when the current dispute arose in 1989, the parties still retained the
dutyto bargain. See id.(citing U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) & (b)(4)(i)(D) (1982)).
See id. at 127. The League's Long Range Planning/Finance Committee adopted
Resolution G-2, which allowed each franchise to maintain a developmental squad of players for the 1989 season. See id. In addition to its active player roster, each team was
permitted to retain an additional six rookies or first year free agents for the pending year.
See id.
2 See id. at 128 (citing Letter from Eugene Upshaw, Representative,
NFLPA, to
Jack M. Donlan, Executive Director, NFL Management Council (May 30, 1989)) (stating
unequivocally that the NFLPA's position is that any football player has the right to negotiate his individual salary). Upshaw's letter was in response to Donlan's salary proposal,
which modified the 1982 collective bargaining agreement by implementing the following
provision: -Article XXII, Salaries, shall not apply, In lieu thereof, establish special services contract providing for salaries of $1,000 per week, prorated on a daily basis." Id. at
127-28. In response to Upshaw's letter, Donlan subsequently notified the NFL that the
issue of developmental squad salaries had reached an impasse. See id. at 128.
26 See id. Beginning in February 1989, Upshaw and Donlan frequently
communicated with each other regarding a new collective bargaining agreement and, specifically,
the issue of developmental squad salaries. See id. at 127-28. Between June and July
1989 it became clear that neither side was wavering on this issue. See id. at 128. In
August, after the NFL sent a final, unchanged letter to the NFLPA, Upshaw notified the
league that its salary cap was illegal and would not be tolerated. See id. (citing Letter
from Eugene Upshaw, Representative, NFLPA, to Jack M. Donlan, Executive Director,
NFL Management Council (Oct. 17, 1989)).
2 See Brown, 782 F. Supp. at 128. The memorandum stated that weekly compensation for developmental players was $1000 and did not permit the negotiation of other
terms. See id. The memorandum also forbade teams from giving any other form of
compensation, such as per diem wages or housing accommodations. See id. Threatened
punishment included fines and/or the loss of future college draft picks. See id.
2S See id. at 127 n.1. The lawsuit commenced on May 9, 1990, as a class action suit
filed by Antony Brown of the Buffalo Bills Football Club. See id. at 127 & n.1. The
other named plaintiffs included James Bishop, John Buddenberg, Gary Couch, Graig
Davis, Matthew J. Jaworski, Ricky Andrews, and Wesley Pritchert. See id. at 127 n.1.
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the Sherman Act.2 9 The NFL defended itself against these allegations by
claiming antitrust immunity pursuant to the nonstatutory labor exemption. 30 After a federal jury heard the case, the players were victorious
and awarded damages in excess of thirty million dollars.31
The Brown litigation commenced in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia. 32 Following their victory at the trial level,
29 See Treadwell, supra note 12, at 974 (citing Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Hear
Players' Case Against NFL, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1995, at 9). Other non-developmental
players who individually negotiated their contracts earned approximately $4000 a week as
opposed to the mandated $1000. See id.
See Brovn, 782 F. Supp. at 128.
31 See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 905, 908 (1993). The exact amount
of the jury award was $30,349,642. See id; see also Greenhouse, supra note 29, at 9
(calculating actual damages at $10 million, representing the difference between the players' possible earning potential as opposed to what they were paid under the fixed system).
The $10 million award was subsequently tripled pursuant to section four of the Clayton
Act, which allows for payment of treble damages to a successful antitrust plaintiff:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor[e] in any district
court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is
found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and
shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1996). The adherence to treble damages dates back to the English Statute of Monopolies and is presently justified under economic and deterrence theories. See
SUJuvAN & HOVEKAMP, supra note 2, at 166-68.

32 See Browm, 782 F. Supp. at 125.

In a memorandum opinion, Judge Lamberth

granted the players' motion to strike and denied the league's motion for summary judgment. See id. at 127. The district court explained that the nonstatutory exemption is a
limited exception to antitrust law and concluded that it terminated simultaneously with the
collective bargaining agreement. See id.at 132. In its opinion, the court was forced to
distinguish Powell v. NationalFootball League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1298-99 (8th Cir. 1989),
which extended the exemption beyond the expiration of a past agreement. See id. at 131;
see also infra notes 78-89 and accompanying text (discussing Powell in detail). Judge
Lamberth explained that without union consent or the threat of antitrust liability, the
league would not have any incentive to bargain towards a new collective bargaining
agreement. See id. at 131-32. The court stated:
Without an endpoint at expiration, the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement and the applicability of the nonstatutory labor exemption remain
in perpetual limbo. Even if a court were to set expiration at impasse, this
would not foster execution of a new collective bargaining agreement or
remove any uncertainty because courts would still have to determine the
existence of 'impasse' and whether court intervention at that point would
be appropriate-- determinations as to which different courts will likely differ.
Id. at 132. The court felt that this bright-line standard would provide guidance and certainty to parties in negotiations as opposed to an extension of the exemption that would
"hinder[ ]rather than facilitate[ ]the execution of new collective bargaining agreements."
Id. at 131. The court noted that four years had passed since the old agreement ended and
the parties still showed no indication of reaching an accord. See id.
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the players were also granted injunctive relief 3 and awarded attorneys'
fees. 34 The NFL then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, which reversed the district court and
held that the nonstatutory exemption barred the players' action. 35 The
players appealed the court of appeals decision to the United States Supreme Court, which granted a writ of certiorari. 36 Upon review, the
37
United States Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision.
The Supreme Court, per Justice Stevens, held that the nonstatutory ex33 See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 20, 25 (D.D.C. 1993).
First, Judge
Lambeith denied five motions by the NFL, which included motions for a new trial, deferral of attorneys' fees, and oral argument. See id. The court ordered a permanent injunction against the NFL and enjoined it from conspiring to establish uniform salaries for any
contingency of players. See id. at 25-26.
34 See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 846 F. Supp. 108, 112 (D.D.C. 1994). As
a
matter of antitrust policy, successful plaintiffs are entitled to receive reasonable attorneys'
fees pursuant to section four of the Clayton Act. See SULIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra
note 2, at 168-70. Prior to this final determination of attorneys' fees, the players previously requested that the amount be awarded according to the current market rate. See
Brown, 839 F. Supp. at 908. At that hearing, the players claimed $1,594,367.50 in attorney's fees, $142,397.51 for litigation costs, and approximately $21,762 to litigate the
issue of fees. See id. Judge Lamberth, however, ruled that further discovery was necessay to establish reasonable hourly rates. See id. Subsequently, the Judge heard the
plaintiffs' reconsideration motion and granted them $1,744,578.41, which included attorneys' fees and costs of litigation. See Brown, 846 F. Supp. at 112.
See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1058 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted,
116 S. Ct. 593 (1995). Chief Judge Edwards held that the exemption applied because the
NFL's actions were legal under the labor laws and predominately affected parties organized in a collective bargaining relationship. See id. at 1048. The court also dismissed the
players' attempt to distinguish between bargaining with a single employer as opposed to a
multiemployer unit. See id. at 1050. The court articulated that because antitrust law is
not intended to prohibit the unilateral action of a single employer, the argument proscribing the same conduct of a multiemployer bargaining unit cannot be sustained. See id. at
1055. Judge Edwards maintained that Congress intended antitrust laws to apply to multiemployer bargaining units because of their necessity in the formation of unions. See id.
at 1056. Additionally, the court determined that the exemption applies to the collective
bargaining process, not necessarily the ultimate product. See id. at 1050 (citing Connell
Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975)); see aLso infra
notes 54-59 and accompanying text (discussing Conne/ in detail). Lastly, the court discounted other theories, noting that none of them agree on a specific point in time at which
the exemption expires and each conflicts with basic principles of labor law. See id. at
1052-53, 1053 n.6. Judge Edwards concluded by enumerating the required criteria for
the exemption to apply: (1) the restraint was imposed through collective bargaining; (2)
only the bargaining parties are affected; and (3) the product market is not impacted. See
id. at 1058. Judge Wald filed a dissenting opinion. See id. at 1058 (Wald, J., dissent-

Ing

See 116 S. Ct. 593 (1995).

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether
federal labor laws protected the owners' self-contained agreement, which unilaterally implemented the same terms of their last best bargaining proposal. See Brown v. Pro Football,
Inc i 116 S. Ct. 2116, 2119 (1996).
See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2127.
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emption applied because it was invoked through collective bargaining negotiation, directly related to the lawful bargaining process, and only con-

cerned the involved _parties pursuant to a matter that they were required

to negotiate jointly.
The historical development of the nonstatutory exemption can be
understood only by first examining the scope of the statutory exemption. 39 In United States v. Hutcheson,4" the Court definitively explained
the implications of the statutory exemption and held that union activity
generally will be immune from antitrust challenges. 4 1 Justice Frankfurter, while criticizing prior restrictive judicial interpretations, bestowed
new meaning upon the three interlacing statutes 42 and interpreted the
broad statutory exemption. 43 Although this framework originally only
concerned strife arising between labor groups, the Court established a
foundation and expanded the exemption to include conflicts of labor and
non-labor organizations."
3s See id.
See SuLuIvAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 960. While the Norris-LaGuardia
Act was unrelated to antitrust law, its enactment forced the Supreme Court to explain the
relationship between labor law and antitrust law, which ultimately created the statutory
exemption. See id.
312 U.S. 219 (1941).
41 See id. at 236-37. Hutcheson involved two labor groups--the United Brotherhood
of Carpenters and the International Association of Machinists-fighting over construction
jobs to build a new facility for Anheuser-Busch. See id. at 228. After the carpenters initiated a strike, they were charged with forming a criminal conspiracy. See id.
42 See id. at 229-31. The Court considered the relationship of the Sherman Act, the
Claton Act, and the Norris-LaGuardia Act. See id.
See id. at 236. Justice Frankfurter articulated that one of Congress's intentions
when it passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act was to reinforce the general purpose of the
Clayton Act, which had been frustrated by courts. See id. The Court emphasized:
If the facts ... come within the conduct enumerated in [section] 20 of the
Clayton Act they do not constitute a crime within the general terms of the
Sherman Law ....
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not
combine with non-labor groups, the licit and the illicit under [section] 20
[of the Clayton Act] are not to be distinguished by any judgment regarding
the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or
unselfishness of the end of which the particular union activities are the
means.
Id. at 232. Hutcheson embodies the foundation for the present statutory exemption. See
Kaminsky, supra note 1, at 13-14.
See Kaminsky, supra note 1, at 14. Four years after Hutcheson, the Court held
that the labor exemption would protect union-employer agreements from antitrst liability
unless other parties were involved who had neither control nor an interest in the pending
employment relationship. See Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Int'l Bhd. of
Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 809-10 (1945) (denying antitrust exemption to an agreement between electrical contractors to purchase solely equipment from union manufacturers and retain exclusive contractual rights upon the union's promise to boycott competi-

tors).
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Because the statutory exemption did not apply to agreements between unions and non-labor groups, 45 the Supreme Court, in United Mine
Workers of America v. PenningtonA4 declined to expand the statutory exemption's scope and hinted at the possible existence of a nonstatutory labor exemption to the Sherman Act. 47 The Court found that the agreement between the union and large coal companies violated antitrust laws
because the exemption applied to the union's unilateral acts, rather than
to their agreements with employers."
In an effort to resolve the inherent conflict described in Pennington,
the Supreme Court simultaneously decided a companion case, Local Union No. 89, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co.. 49 In Jewel
45 See Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 232. In 1981, the Supreme Court restated
the test for
the statutory exemption. See H.A. Artists & Assocs. v. Actors' Equity Ass'n, 451 U.S.
704, 714-16 (1981). In H.A. Artists, an actors' union developed a licensing system in
which union actors were to be represented only by agents who had a franchise agreement
with the union. See id. at 709. To obtain such a license, an agent not only had to pay a
franchise fee, but was also required to comply with union restrictions pertaining to the
amount of commission that the agent could charge. See id. at 710. The Supreme Court
did not object to the licensing aspect of the scheme, reasoning that it was designed to
promote the union's self-interest and was necessary to uphold the wage structure. See id.
at 719-22. The Supreme Court declared that it was illegal to charge an agent money for
inclusion on the licensed list and declared that the fee was unnecessary for the administration of the regulatory system. See id. at 722. For the statutory exemption to apply,
the Supreme Court held that the initial inquiry is: (1) whether a union is acting in its selfinterest; and (2) whether a combination exists with a non-labor group. See id. at 714.
For a union to act in its self-interest, ordinarily a labor dispute needs to exist "concerning
terms or conditions of employment." See id. n.14. Additionally, to satisfy the second
requirement, unions must act "independently." See id. at 716. For a detailed analysis of
these two elements, see Kaminsky, supranote 1, at 25-30.
46 381 U.S. 657 (1965) (three Justice plurality).
47 See id. at 664-66. Pennington addressed an antitrust challenge against a union after
it contracted with large coal mining companies, whereby the union agreed to impose new
and higher wages on small coal companys' employees in an effort to eliminate the competition. See id. at 660. The wage clause of the agreement, entitled the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement, was not immune from antitrust laws. See id. at 669. Justice
White, writing for the plurality, noted that unions do not violate antitrust provisions when
they either jointly conclude a wage agreement with a multiemployer negotiating unit or
merely seek similar wages from another employer. See id. at 664. The Justice concluded, however, that a union loses its antitrust exemption if it is established that the union has colluded with one group of employers to implement a wage scale on another bargaining unit. See id. at 665.
48 See id. at 662. The Court found that union-employer arrangements or agreements
were neither explicitly permitted nor proscribed by the Clayton or Norris-LaGuardia
Acts. See id. One implicit problem, however, rests with the fact that labor law encourages collective bargaining contracts, which often include certain agreements with nonlabor organizations. See SULUIVAN & HOVENKAM, supra note 2, at 961; see also Kaminsky, supra note 1, at 19 (observing the ambiguity surrounding the exemption's
boundaries and its applicability between unions and multiemployer units).
49 381 U.S. 676 (1965) (plurality opinion).
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Tea, the Supreme Court for the first time formally recognized the existence of the nonstatutory labor exemption when it analyzed an employment clause restricting the working hours of Chicago butchers.5 0 After
balancing the union workers' interests against the impact on the product
market, Justice White announced the basic test to determine whether to
utilize the nonstatutory exemption: A restriction must be "intimately related" to one's working conditions, hours and wages, and obtained
through good faith, arm's-length bargaining. 51 In a concurring opinion,
Justice Goldberg emphasized that antitrust laws do not apply to any mandatory subjects of negotiation pursuant to the collective bargaining
agreement. .
Although Jewel Tea set forth the framework to determine whether
the nonstatutory exemption can be utilized as a defense, the Supreme
Court hardly evinced clear guidelines to be followed 5 3 Therefore, ten
years after Jewel Tea, the Court again addressed the scope of the nonstatutory exemption in Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers Local Union No. 100.54 After considering a contract between a union and an em-

50 See id. at 688-91.

Jewel Tea involved a multiunion-multiemployer agreement to
close Chicago butcheries between six o'clock p.m. and nine o'clock a.m. in an attempt to
protect butchers from either unskilled laborers or self-service markets. See id. at 680.
The employers argued working hour restrictions attained through collective bargaining
was illegal. See id. at 688. The Court, however, was more concerned with the labor
union's "immediate and direct" interests and, after weighing the minimal interests of the
employees, concluded that the "National Labor Relations Act places beyond the reach of
the Sherman Act union-employer agreements on when, as well as how long, employees
must work." Id. at 691.
51 See id. at 689-90. Justice White further articulated:
Employers and unions are required to bargain about wages, hours and
working conditions, and this fact weighs heavily in favor of antitrust exemption for agreements on these subjects. But neither party need bargain
about other matters and either party commits an unfair labor practice if it
conditions its bargaining upon discussions of a nonmandatory subject .... Thus the issue in this case is whether the marketing-hours restriction, like wages, and unlike prices, is so infiately related to wages,
hours and working conditions that the unions' successful attempt to obtain
that provision through bona fide, arm's-length bargaining in pursuit of

their own labor union policies, and not at the behest of or in combination
with nonlabor groups, falls within the protection of the national labor policy and is therefore exempt from the Sherman Act. We think that it is.
Id. at 689-90 (citation omitted) (emphases added).

52 See id.at 710 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice Goldberg emphasized that if labor law policy mandated that a particular concern be subject to collective bargaining, then
antitrust law cannot apply. See id. at 710-12 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
53 See Kaminsky, supra note 1, at 21.
421 U.S. 616 (1975).
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ployer with whom the union had no relationship,5 5 the Supreme Court
limited the exemption's applicability to parties directly involved in the
bargaining relationship as well as to fundamental issues of employee interest.5 Although the Court acknowledged that the union's conduct was
legal, it declined to afford nonstatutory protection because the chosen
methods contravened basic antitrust policy. 5 7 Thus, the Court professed

that the nonstatutory exemption should be invoked only when necessary
to protect restraints promoting labor policy5s and to protect59 unionemployer agreements that establish wage and working conditions.
The first time the nonstatutory labor exemption was applied to professional sports by a federal appellate court occurred in Mackey v. National FootballLeague. In Mackey, several professional football play-

55 See id.at 623. In Connel, a construction union forced a multiemployer bargaining
association to sign a clause that required the general contractors to subcontract work only
to firms that maintained collective bargaining agreements with the union. See id. at 62526. Local 100, the bargaining representative for the plumbers and mechanical workers,
already had an agreement with Mechanical Contractors Association of Dallas, which
comprised a most favored nation clause. See id. at 619. Thus, any favorable contract
offered to another employer had to also be offered to the union with the same terms. See
id. Local 100 then approached Connell to subcontract mechanical work but placed the
following linitafion upon Connell: "[I]f the contractor should contract or subcontract any
of the aforesaid work falling within the normal trade jurisdiction of the union, said contractor shall contract or subcontract such work only to firms that are parties to an executed, current collective bargaining agreement with Local Union 100 ... ." Id. at 620.
Connell originally refused to approve this clause, but after the union staged a strike, it
agreed and subsequently brought an action under sections one and two of the Sherman
Act. See id. at 620-21.
56 See id. at 623. Justice Powell recognized that certain union-employer agreements
should be shielded from antitrust attack in an effort to accommodate Congress's dual objectives of collective bargaining pursuant to the NLRA and the promotion of free competition. See id. at 622 (citing Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 690). The Court, however, nullified
the agreement between the union and the contractors, determining that it unnecessarily
limited entry into the market and restrained competition. See id. at 625. The Court explained that while the statutory exemption may, under appropriate circumstances, permit
unions to unilaterally impose restraints, the nonstatutory exemption does not offer similar
protection when the conduct involves a union and non-labor group in a competitive business environment. See id. at 622-23.
57 See id. at 625. The Court found that the agreement discriminated against
and purposely excluded the non-union subcontractors from the market. See id. at 624. Further,
the Court concluded that simply because the union's goal was legal, its chosen methods of
implementation would not prevent antitrust scrutiny. See id. at 625. The Court noted the
overwhelming anti-competitive effects of eliminating competition and found the restraint
unjustifiable under any congressional labor policy. See id.
58 See id. at 622-23.
See Connell Constr. Co., 421 U.S. at 622. If, however, an agreement solely restrains competition for the employer's product, the Court noted that traditional antitrust
ana0sis should determine whether the activity is legal. See id. at 623.
543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
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ers brought an action against the NFL in response to the Rozelle Rule.61
The players considered this new rule to be a refusal to deal and a restraint of trade because it hindered player mobility between teams by requiring the new team to compensate the old one. Although the league's
defense asserted that the nonstatutory exemption should protect the newly
implemented rule, the district court disagreed and declared the restriction
per se illegal 63 and "clearly contrary to public policy."64
61 See Mackey v. National Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000, 1002
(D. Minn.
1975), aftd, 543 F.2d 606, 623 (8th Cir. 1976). The Rozelle Rule was instituted by
Commisioner Peter Rozelle in an attempt to create a reserve system, which would allow
a player to become a free agent after his contract expired with his current team. See id.
at 1003. Any club that signed this player to a new contract, however, was obligated to
compensate the old team. See id. at 1003-04. If the two NFL teams could not agree on
the amount of compensation, Rozelle would make the final determination and award the
former team either current players or future college draft picks from the new team. See
id. at 1004. The rule, Article 12.1(H), was an amendment to the NFL Constitution and
Bylaws and stipulated:
Any player, whose contract with a League club has expired, shall thereupon become a free agent and shall no longer be considered a member of
the team of that club following the expiration date of such contract. Whenever a player, becoming a free agent in such manner, thereafter signs a
contract with a different club in the League, then, unless mutually satisfactory arrangements have been concluded between the two League clubs, the
Commissioner may name and then award to the former club one or more
players, from the Active, Reserve, or Selection List (including future selection choices) of the acquiring club as the Commissioner in his sole discretion deems fair and equitable; any such decision by the Commissioner
shall be final and conclusive.
Id. See also Mackey, 543 F.2d at 609 n.1, discussing the discretion afforded the Commissioner. Every NFL team adopted the Rozelle Rule in 1963. See Mackey, 407 F.
Supp. at 1003. In addition, any player was ineligible to participate in any NFL game unless they signed a Standard Player Contract, which included the NFL's constitution and
bylaws. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 610.
See Mackey, 407 F. Supp. at 1002. The players brought suit under section one of
the Sherman Act and sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at
609. Originally, 36 players initiated a class action suit, which was withdrawn before the
case went to trial. See id. At trial, only 15 players remained; six sought only injunctive
relief while the others also asked for damages. See id. n.2.
63 See Mackey, 407 F. Supp. at 1007. The district court, per Judge Larson, determined that the Rozelle Rule constituted a group boycott without undertaking any antitrust
or economic analysis. See id. The trial lasted for 55 days and one commentator found it
interesting that the court needed that amount of time to invoke the per se rule, which is
ordinarily used to eliminate "prolonged, complicated, and costly inquiries into the history
of the industry and the history and impact of the practice." Gary R. Roberts, Sports
League Restraints on the Labor Market: The Failure of Stare Decisis, 47 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 337, 384 n.185 (1986).
64 See Mackey, 407 F. Supp. at 1007. The court not only considered this a per se
violation, but also indicated that it would violate the Rule of Reason because players'
salaries would be lessened and their freedom for employment restricted. See id. at 100708.
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On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, the district court's holding, declaring the Rozelle Rule illegal, was upheld but on a different rationale. 65
Building on the precedent of Jewel Tea, Connell, and Pennington, the
court established the following three-prong test to determine if the nonstatutory exemption applied: (1) "the restraint on trade primarily affects
only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship"; (2) "the
agreement sought to be exempted concerns a mandatory subject of collective bargaining"; and (3) "the agreement souet to be exempted is the
product of bona fide arm's-length bargaining."
While the court held
that the NFL's imposed restraint on player movement satisfied the first
two prongs, 67 it failed the third prong and was therefore still subject to

65 See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 619-20.

Judge Lay first declared that the professional
football industry is unique, which makes it inappropriate to apply to it the per se rule.
See id. at 619. le court acknowledged the league's important desire to maintain competitive balance, however, Judge Lay invalidated the Rozelle Rule pursuant to the Rule of
Reason because it was "significantly more restrictive than necessary." See id. at 622.
Furthermore, the court emphasized that the restriction was unlimited in duration and

without procedural safeguards. See id.
66 Id. at 614 (citations omitted).

The court explained that before this analysis commences, a court must first conclude that an agreement was actually reached by the parties. See id. at 612. After finding that such an agreement was in place concerning the
Rozelle Rule, the court observed that these three criteria would sufficiently accommodate
both the labor and antitrust concerns. See id. at 615.
One commentator has suggested that the first, or "affects only," prong ensures that
collective bargaining is promoted. See Kaminsky, supra note 1, at 40 (citing William C.
Zifchak, Labor-AntitrustPrinciples Applicable to Joint Labor-Management Conduct, 21
DUQ. L. REv. 365, 366 (1983)). Furthermore, the second, or "mandatory subject of
W
collective bargaining" prong, is equivalent to the "intimately related
" requirement set
forth in Jewel Tea. See id. at 35-38. Consequently, the collective bargaining must relate
to salaries, hours, and work conditions. See id. at 35.
67 See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615. The court held that the Rozelle Rule only affected
the parties to the agreement. See id. To clarify this prong of nonstatutory protection, the
court in Zimmerman v. National Football League recently clarified that the exemption
must be withheld if the agreement primarily affects competitors or third parties outside of
the bargaining relationship. See 632 F. Supp. 398, 405 (D.D.C. 1986).
The second prong, or "mandatory subject of bargaining" prong, requires that an
agreement relate to "'wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.'"
Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615 (quoting NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348-49
(1958)). In addition, this determination should be based upon the practical effect of an
agreement, not the specific form. See id. (citing American Fed'n of Musicians v. Carroll,
391 U.S. 99, 113-14 (1968)). The Eighth Circuit submitted that the restriction did not
facially relate to a mandatory subject of bargaining. See id. The court, however, upheld
the district court's determination that the rule restricted a player's ability to switch teams
and also depressed salaries. See id. From that standpoint, Judge Lay equated the rule to
a mandatory subject of bargaining. See id.
68 See id. at 616. Looking at the history of negotiations between the NFL and the
NFLPA, the court recognized that the Rozelle Rule, in form, was part of past agreements
only because the NFLPA had been in a weak bargaining position after its initial creation.
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antitrust scrutiny. 69 Although the Eighth Circuit established that the
nonstatutory exemption could be invoked under more appropriate circumstances, the court declined to address the exemption's scope beyond
the expiration of a past collective bargaining agreement.7 °
The first time a court specifically addressed when the nonstatutory
exemption terminates occurred in Bridgeman v. National Basketball
Ass'n.7 1 In Bridgeman, after the union and owners' agreement had expired, allegations arose that the collele draft, salary cap, and right of
first refusal violated the Sherman Act.
The players contended that the
exemption should expire simultaneously with the end of a prior collective
bargaining agreement. 73 Judge Debevoise of the district court of New
Jersey discarded that alternative. 74 The district court also rejected a pro-

posed "impasse" theory, which would end immunity once the two sides
reach an impasse in negotiations, 75 and fulfilled the owners' desire to alSee id. at 615-16. The court concluded that the rule was originally imposed unilaterally
and continues to restrain the players. See id. at 616. Judge Lay stated:
[Wie find substantial evidence to support the finding that there was no bona
fide arm's-length bargaining over the Rozelle Rule preceding the execution
of the 1968 and 1970 agreements. The Rule imposes significant restrictions on players, and its form has remained unchanged since it was unilaterally promulgated by the clubs in 1963 ....
The union's acceptance of
the status quo by the continuance of the Rozelle Rule in the initial collective bargaining.., cannot serve to immunize [it] from the scrutiny of the
Sherman Act.
Id.
The third prong of the Mackey test was designed to require good faith bargaining as
opposed to extensive negotiations over every clause of a new collective agreement. See
Kaminsky, supra note 1, at 50-51.
69 See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 616.
70 See id. n.18. The court chose not to analyze the possible effects after an
agreement terminated and, consequently, did not hypothetically explain any effect of the nonstatutory exemption. See id.
71 675 F. Supp. 960 (D.N.J. 1987). Prior to Bridgeman, Mackey remained the established framework. See McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1198 (6th
Cir. 1979); Zimmerman, 632 F. Supp. at 403; Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 602 F.
Supp. 525, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), affrd on other grounds, 809 F.2d 954, 962-63 (2d Cir.
1987).
72 See Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 961-62. To explain how these obstacles restrained
trade, the union asserted that the college draft did not allow a player to choose his team;
the salary cap limited the amount of money a player can earn; and the right of first refusal
prohibited players from switching teams. See id.
73 See id. at 965.
74 See id. Judge Debevoise reasoned that if the exemption ended the moment
the
agreement expired, the owners' responsibilities under the NLRA would be placed in
jeopardy because, in such a case, the status quo must be maintained until impasse. See
id.; see also Corcoran, supra note 8, at 1060-61.
See Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 967. In rejecting this theory, the judge noted that
a deadlock at an impasse hardly signifies the end of negotiations. See id. at 965-66. The
court reiterated that the purpose of the nonstatutory exemption is to promote collective
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low the exemption to continue indefinitely. 76 The court concluded that
immunity should continue so long as an employer imposes a restraint unchanged and reasonably7 believes that the next agreement would also include a similar practice. 7
The next pronouncement concerning the nonstatutory labor exemption's duration after a collective bargaining agreement expires occurred in
Powell v. NationalFootballLeague. In Powell, the 1987 collective bargaining agreement between the NFL and its players had expired,79 and°
the players challenged the Right of First Refusal/Compensation System.s

bargaining and that to determine whether an impasse has been reached is difficult. See
id. at 966. Specifically, the court quoted that:
'Whether a bargaining impasse exists is a matter of judgment. Tle bargaining history, the good faith of the parties in negotiations,
the length of
the negotiations, the importance of the issue or issues as to which there is
disagreement, the contemporaneous understanding of the parties as to the
state of negotiations, are all relevant factors to be considered in deciding
whether an impasse in bargaining existed.'
Id. n.5 (quoting Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967)).
76 See id. at 966. The judge contended that to allow immunity indefinitely would discourage collective bargaining because a union would be at the will of an employer and
forced to bind itself to agreements that could not be challenged in court. See id. The
court indicated, however, that "[alithough ... the rules embodied in the collective bargaining agreement are not automatically disregarded the instant the clock rins out on the
agreement, the game cannot last forever." Id.
77 See id. at 967.
78 678 F. Supp. 777, 789 (D. Minn. 1988), rev'd, 930 F.2d 1293, 1304
(8th Cir.
19

S).ee Lock, supra note 7, at 346-51, 359-69 (giving historical overview of the labor
strife in professional football). In 1977, the NFL and NFLPA consummated a five-year
collective bargaining agreement, which included a Right of First Refusal/Compensation
System. See Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 779. When that agreement ended in 1982, the
players attempted to eliminate this provision. See Lock, supra note 7, at 361. The NFL
refused, and the players subsequently went on strike for 57 days. See Powell, 678 F.
Supp. at 780. A new five-year agreement was executed in December 1982, that modified
the First Refusal System. See id. Upon expiration of that agreement in 1987, the players
again attempted to eliminate that provision and, after being rejected, went on another 24day strike. See id. at 781. On the last day of the strike, a lawsuit was commenced that
alleged that the Right of First Refusal/Compensation System violated the Sherman Act.
See id.
See Powel, 678 F. Supp. at 779. This alleged restraint of trade originated through
the evolution of the Rozelle Rule. See id. After the Eighth Circuit held that the Rozelle
Rule violated the Sherman Act, the primary change incorporated into the Right of First
Refusal/Compensation System was the elimination of the Commissioner's discretion. See
Lock, supra note 7, at 361. Section 17 of the 1977 agreement, however, allowed teams
to retain a player's rights after his contract expired if that player was given a new salary
that was 110% of his old one. See id. n.121. Similarly, if a new team offered that same
player a contract, his former team could simply match the offer to retain the player. See
Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 779.
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Although this restricted the players' ability tc switch teams, s8 the
2 NFL

maintained the rule after an impasse in negotiations was reached.8

After considering the league's two theories that claimed immunity

from antitrust laws, 3 the district court of Minnesota determined that the
nonstatutory exemption will extend only beyond a past agreement's expiration until the parties reach an impasse in negotiations. 84 The district
court reasoned that this termination point would promote labor golicy and
allow for protection so long as good faith negotiating occurred.
Upon appeal to the Eighth Circuit, however, the "impasse" standard was rejected and reversed 8 6 The court held that the nonstatutory
exemption extends indefinitely beyond impasse and it will preserve
agreements that arise out of an ongoing collective bargaining relation-

91

See Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 781 n.6. During the agreement existing between 1982

and 1987, no veteran player moved to a new team under the Right of First Refusal/Compensation System. See id. Furthermore, only one out of 1415 eligible players
even received an offer. See id.
82 See id.at 778. During the players' 24-day strike, the owners hired replacements
from the United States Football League to ensure that some sort of competition occurred.
See Neil K. Roman, Illegal Procedure: The National Football Leagues Players Union's
Improper Use of Antitrust Litigationfor Purposes of Collective Bargaining, 67 Dqv. U.
L. REv. 111, 120 (1990). On the last day of their strike, the players commenced this suit
to enjoin the league from imposing the then current system of free agency. See Powell,
678 F. Supp. at 781.
83 See Powel, 678 F. Supp. at 782. The first theory, "absolute immunity,"
asserted
that the restraints were a mandatory subject of bargaining and only affected the present
parties. See id.at 783. The second theory, "survival doctrine," requested indefinite
protection after an agreement ended. See id. Although the court acknowledged that the
exemption does not instantly dissolve upon expiration, the court asserted that it cannot
last indefinitely because allowing the standards of the previous agreement to continue
would permit illegal provisions to last longer than those that were permissible. See id. at
788. Similarly, the court discarded the players' desire to allow the exemption to continue
onlyuntil they clearly assented to the imposed terms or practices. See id. at 786.
See id.at 788. Judge Doty gave three justifications for establishing impasse
as the
time when the exemption should expire: (1) the obligation under labor law to engage in
good faith negotiations relating to mandatory subjects of bargaining; (2) promoting collective bargaining and enhancing the possibility to reach a compromise; and (3) antitrust
laws are not avoided but merely delayed to encourage settlement. See id.at 789. The
court equated impasse with deadlock, and concluded that one is achieved when neither
party is willing to alter its position despite each side's best efforts during the negotiation.
See id.at 788. Furthermore, the court asserted that the impasse test is satisfied once the
parties exhaust the prospects of settlement. See id.
85 See id.at 786-87. In reaching its conclusion, the court rejected the Bridgeman
theory, which allowed the exemption to survive if a restriction was imposed unchanged
and the employer reasonably believed that the practice would be incorporated into the
following agreement. See id.at 787 (citing Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n, 675
F. Supp. 960, 967 (D.N.J. 1987)). The court stated that it did not feel that the Bridgeman
standard advanced the basic principles of labor law. See id.
86 See Powell v. National Football League, 930 F.2d
1293, 1304 (8th Cir. 1989).
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ship.8 7 The court supported its decision by proclaiming that the exemption was created to promote labor policy and by stating any other remedies should be fully pursued in a labor law context. 8 To extend the exemption beyond an impasse would, according to the court, force players

and owners to continue negotiating until they reached a fair compromise.8 9 Ultimately, however, this decision increased the NFL's bargain-

ing power and created unforeseen problems. 90
From the aforementioned base of judicial precedent emerged the
United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Brown v. Pro Football,
Inc.91 The issue before the Court was whether the nonstatutory exemption barred the NFLPA's antitrust action, considering that the past
agreement expired and current negotiations reached an impasse. 92 Justice
Breyer, writing for the majority, 3 affirmed the decision of the court of
appeals and determined that the exemption extends to post-impasse
87 See id. at 1303-04. Judge Gibson held that while labor policy may sometimes
supplant antitrust policy, the holding should not be interpreted to allow management a
permanent exemption from antitrust law. See id. (quoting Continental Maritime v. Pacific
Coast Metal Trades Dist. Council, 817 F.2d 1391, 1393 (9th Cir. 1987)).
99 See id. at 1300-01. First, the court reiterated that an obligation to bargain
continues to exist between the parties. See id. at 1300. Furthermore, before and after an impasse is reached, a maintenance of the status quo is obligated and authorized, respectively. See id. Lastly, the court stressed that upon impasse, employers could institute
new or different terms if they were reasonably contemplated and articulated prior to impasse. See id.
In terms of alternate remedies, the court felt that the parties could (1) continue to
bargain; (2) resort to economic force; and/or (3) file a claim with the NLRB. See id. at
1303. Emphatically, the court stated that until the NLRB asserted its involvement, the
exem pion would continue to apply. See id. at 1303-04.
See id. at 1303. The court reasoned that each side had available methods of resolving the dispute; players had the ability to initiate a strike and owners were permitted to
lock-out their employees. See id. at 1302. Therefore, the court stressed that any action
under the Sherman Act would frustrate the balance previously established through labor
lawjolicy. See id.
See Corcoran, supra note 8, at 1064-65. Because the players could not bring an
antitrust claim, they subsequently decertified the union so that the owners could not indefinitely shield themselves behind the nonstatutory exemption. See id. (discussing the
resulting player suits after decertification in Wiae v. National Football League, 822 F.
Supp. 1389, 1394 (D. Minn. 1993); Jackson v. National FootballLeague, 802 F. Supp.
226, 228 (D. Minn. 1992); and McNeil v. NationalFootball League, 764 F. Supp. 1351,
1353 (D. Minn. 1991)). Corcoran poignantly observed that such a result--decertification
of a union-completely contravenes the intended effect of creating the nonstatutory exention. See id.
116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996).
9 See id. at 2119.
93 See id. at 2118. The decision was eight to one; Justice Breyer, writing
for the
majority, was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg. See id. Justice Stevens authored a dissenting opinion.
See id.
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agreements amongst
employers, which insulated the NFL from any anti94
trust liability.

Justice Breyer began the Court's analysis with a historical explanation of the nonstatutory exemption's origin, purpose, and development
through federal labor policy. 95 While discussing the intertwined relationship between antitrust and labor law, the Court stressed that past congressional acts were intended to "prevent judicial use of antitrust law to
resolve labor disputes .... ,96 Justice Breyer also explained that the
nonstatutory exemption was judicially created to strike and ensure a necessary balance between labor and antitrust law. 9'
Although the Court recognized that the exemption applies to employee-employer relationships and fosters collective bargaining, it did not
elaborate on that issue. 98 Rather, the majority analyzed the exemption's
parameters and concluded that, upon impasse, it extends to employer
agreements that implement "their last best good-faith wage offer. " 99 The
Court reasoned that unilateral employer acts, while subject to restrictions,
are tolerated under labor policy. 1° Furthermore, the Court expanded the
exemption's scope while concluding that no difference exists between the
unilateral act of a single employer and the unilateral act of a multiemployer bargaining unit. 101

94 See id. at 2127.

95 See id. at 2120. Justice Breyer stated that labor policy is designed to further three
primary goals: (1) uninhibited collective bargaining (citing 29 U.S.C. § 151); (2) "goodfaith bargaining over wages, hours and working conditions," (citing 29 U.S.C. §§
158(a)(5), (d)); and (3) reinforcing the NLRB's authority to arbitrate alleged labor misconduct (citing 29 U.S.C. § 153). See id.
9 Brow%, 116 S. Ct. at 2120 (citing Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 709 (1965)). Justice Breyer asserted that the nonstatutory exemption supplements the statutory exemption, which allows Congress-not the
judiciary-to determine what constitutes reasonable practices relating to industrial strife.
See id.
97 See id. The Court articulated that the nonstatutory exemption necessarily effectuates the objectives of federal labor law even though some restraints on competition may
esce
antitrust liability. See id.
See id. at 2121. The majority observed that the petitioners and the dissenting Justice both conceded these points. See id.
99 See id. Justice Breyer again harkened that basic labor principles
apply to the imposition of post-impasse terms if they are required subjects of bargaining. See id.
100 See id. The Court declared that unless the new terms were "'reasonably comprehended'" from the pre-impasse proposals, an employer would be considered to be acting
in bad faith. See id.
101 See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2121-22. Justice Breyer noted the common practice of
multiemployer units implementing new terms after an inpasse. See id. at 2121. More
importantly, the majority observed that over 40% of collective bargaining agreements in
major industries including transportation, construction, manufacturing, and real estate are
achieved through the use of multiemployer negotiating units. See id. at 2122.
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Justice Breyer next recognized the inherent fallacy of allowing antitrust law to govern situations that relate to vital employee issues, such as
salary and working hours.102 The Court explained that if antitrust principles were invoked against a bargaining unit at impasse, tremendous uncertainty would ensue and possibly force an employer to violate either the
Antitrust Act or labor laws. 1°3 Consequently, Justice Breyer refrained
from creating "a web of detailed rules" and stressed that parties can
the National Labor Relation Board's
avoid confusion by simply following
1 4

(NLRB's) established rules. 0
Continuing, the Court indicated that the exemption's rationale
10 5
permits it to encompass more than just labor-management agreements.
In addition, Justice Breyer dismissed the petitioner's proposal that would

have required mutual consent for the exemption to continue. '6 The
Court also rejected ending the exemption at impasse because the bargaining unit remains intact, the parties are obligated to continue bargaining
and individual interim agreements can be negotiated with the union.
Justice Breyer maintained that unless parties reach interim agreements,
employers would be forced to act in unison-a facial violation of the
Sherman Act. 108

102 See id. The Court explained that antitrust law proscribes all unreasonable agree-

ments between competitors; generally, liability will attach with nothing more than uniform
behavior. See id.
103 See id. at 2123. The Court observed that antitrust liability could be triggered by
economic collusion amongst the employers. See id. Alternatively, as noted by the Court,
if one unit deviated from the others, then that employer could violate labor laws. See id.
The Court held that antitrust liability would only promulgate uncertainty in the bargaining
process because antitrust law is at odds with collective bargaining principles. See id.
104 See id. Justice Breyer explained that the NLRB determines what is socially or
economically permissible through the collective bargaining process. See id.
105 See id.
106 See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2123-24. The Court explained that this was illogical and
impractical because the collective bargaining process may occur before an agreement is

finalized or after an agreement ends. See id. at 2123. Furthermore, the majority emphasized that employees should not be coerced to accept a negotiating position if an employer
remains inflexible. See id. The Court also stressed that the prohibition on employer coersion extends to legitimate bargaining tactics such as lookouts or the use of replacement

employees. See id. at 2124.

See id. The Solicitor General made this argument because the status quo need not
be maintained after an impasse. See id.
los See id. Justice Breyer outlined four permissible options employers may undertake
at impasse: (1) preserve the status quo; (2) implement the last offer; (3) lock-out the
workers; or (4) arrange for separate interim agreements. See id. (citing 1 PATRICK
HARDIN, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, 516-20, 696-99 (3d ed. 1992)). The Court also
observed that the first three options require uniform employer action, which generally is
not protected by antitrust law. See id.
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The Justice also asserted that it is difficult to identify an impasse because of its subjective nature. 1 9 The Court therefore concluded that it
would be unfair to subject employers to antitrust liability at such an uncertain and vague point in time.11° Justice Breyer similarly rejected a
modified impasse standard, which would reinstate the exemption upon the
satisfaction of certain conditions."' The majority reasoned that future
second guessing under
such a standard would completely undermine the
11 2
process.
bargaining
The Court also criticized a theory that would exempt post-impasse
bargaining tactics, as opposed to substantive negotiation issues, because
the two are often intimately related in the bargaining process.113 Justice
Breyer further stipulated that the collective bargaining process must be
effected14 to justify employer compensation under various state regulations.
Although the Court recognized that the economics of professional
sports differ from other businesses,1 15 Justice Breyer refused to accept
109 See id. at 2124-25. The Court held that impasses are "'a recurring feature...
[of]
negotiations which in almost all cases [are] eventually broken, through either a change of
mind or the application of economic force.'" Id. at 2125 (quoting Charles D. Bonanno
Linen Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 412 (1982)). In addition, impasses differ in
degree and, according to the Court, are strategically manipulated to arise continually
throughout labor negotiations. See id.
110 See id. Justice Breyer noted that employers would have to guess
whether parties
had reached an ultimate impasse; an erroneous calculation, however, would entail either
antitrust or labor law liability. See id.
II See Brow, 116 S. Ct. at 2125. Arguing for the respondents, the Solicitor General
suggested that the exemption should continue for a reasonable time so that parties can
confirm with their attorneys that an impasse has in fact occurred. See id. At that point, if
good faith bargaining resumes then the exemption should persist throughout negotiations.
See id.
112 See id. Justice Breyer showed how this modification would not solve the problem.
See id. The Justice pointed out that once another impasse is reached, the exemption
would disappear in the middle of negotiations. See id. At this juncture, the Court noted
that antitrust courts can question and invalidate the parties' bargaining decisions, which
may force them to take undesired action even though their conduct did not violate labor
law. See id.
113 See id. The Court explained that "employers can, and often do, employ
the imposition of 'terms' as a bargaining 'tactic.'" Id. (citations omitted). For this reason, liability would rest on a detached antitrust court's determination about an employer's subjective motivation. See id. Justice Breyer indicated that this type of inquiry would be
even more difficult than ascertaining a precise time of impasse. See id.
114 See id. at 2126. The players also proposed utilizing state backdrop statutes,
but the
Court pointed out that those remedies are neither invoked to advance collective bargaininq nor related to the antitrust/labor law history. See id.
15 See id. The Court pointed out that individual teams do not directly
compete economically but, rather, depend on one another for economic survival. See id. (citing National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 10102 (1984)).
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that the industry as a whole warranted an alteration of the antitrust exemption. 116 Not persuaded that football players are different than other
unionized workers Justice Breyer concluded that the same legal principles must apply. IIF
In concluding that antitrust law did not apply to the owners' unilateral implementation of a fixed salary for the developmental players, the
Court fashioned a four-prong test to analyze post-impasse conduct and
actions. 11 8Justice Breyer made it clear, though, that the exemption was
not indefinitely absolute and under appropriate circumstances, an antitrust violation might occur.119 The Court, however, declined to define
the full scope and parameters of the nonstatutory exemption and reiterated that the NLRB must serve in this function. 1o
In the only dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens declared that fixing
developmental player salaries below free market prices directly conflicted
with antitrust and labor law policy.12 1

The Justice maintained that not

116 See Brow, 116 S. CL at 2126. Justice Breyer first indicated that the only
special
feature of professional sports revolves around its interest and excitement. See id. Furthermore, the Court considered the players' skills irrelevant because, according to the
Court, depending upon their talent level, it could both enhance or detract leverage at the
bargaining table. See id. The Court evinced that the antitrust exemption applies equally
to all employees regardless of their specific field of work. See id.
117 See id. Justice Breyer did not agree with the dissent's opinion that the relationship
between players and owners was unique or atypical. See id. The Court also found it unnecessary and impractical to inquire into the dissent's concerns regarding the league's
truejpurpose. See id.
See id. at 2127. Justice Breyer upheld the owner's conduct because:
[It] took place during and immediately after a collective bargaining negotiation. It grew out of, and was directly related to, the lawful operation of
the bargaining process. It involved a matter that the parties were required
to negotiate collectively. And it concerned only the parties to the collective
bargaining relationship.
Id.
119 See id. The Court stated that
the holding was narrower than the appellate
court's
decision, which completely waived antitrust liability so long as the process of collective
bargaining was the primary reason for imposing trade restraints. See id. at 2119.
Rather, Justice Breyer maintained that a Sherman Act violation could result if the restraints were imposed "sufficiently distant in time and in circumstances from the collective bargaining process." Id. at 2127. The Court's main concern, as highlighted by Justice Breyer, was to stop the Sherman Act from sigmfican/y interfering with the
ne~otiation process. See id. (emphasis added).
See id. While referring to the exemption's extreme outer boundaries, Justice
Breyer submitted that the Court should defer to the NLRB's specialized judgment and

Colress's apparent desire to vest in the NLRB this responsibility.

See id.

See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2128 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens began his
analysis by insinuating that the majority had allowed economic theory to cloud the constitutionality of the owner's conduct. See id. Justice Stevens also emphasized that the fundamental principles of the Sherman Act were promotion of free competition, avoiding
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only should deference be paid to the jury's finding that the salaries were
dramatically inadequate, but that the burden rests with the owners to establish that the implementation was not illegal. 1 2 Referring to the basic
reasons for promoting a unionized labor force, Justice Stevens stressed
that exemptions enable employees to achieve higher present
salaries,
123
which would not be possible without collective bargaining.
Although the dissent agreed that the nonstatutory exemption legitimately protects certain collective action, 124 Justice Stevens steadfastly
objected to the exemption's allowance of employer wage depression. 1Because the exemption was created to protect collective employee action,
Justice Stevens found it ironic that employers could now avoid individual
salary negotiations under the exemption's guise.'1
Furthermore, Justice
Stevens articulated three reasons why the players' dilemma was not a
typical collective bargaining case. 127
First, Justice Stevens opposed broadening the labor exemption because of the unique character of the sports industry; although collectively
represented, each player has always negotiated his own individual salary. 12 Second, the Justice declared that the league designed the imposed
salary restraint as a means of exerting pressure on individual owners,
rather than as a negotiating tactic against the players.1 9 Third, Justice
Stevens stressed that a bargaining impasse was never achieved; the play-

collusive agreements, and discouraging arrangements that establish wages below fair
market value. See id.
122 See id. The Justice noted that the Rule of Reason may have ultimately found the
implementation of fixed salaries justifiable; however, the fundamental legal principles
were more important to his analysis. See id. at 2128-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
123 See id. at 2129 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens then briefly discussed the
origins of the statutory exemption as well as the purpose of the judicially created nonstatutoryexemption. See id.
See id. According to Justice Stevens, promoting the collective bargaining process
and upholding the essence of a multiemployer bargaining unit are two valid reasons to
immunize certain employer conduct. See id.
125 See id. Aside from the fact that the salaries were undervalued, Justice Stevens's
other major contention was that developmental squads were neither a part of past agreements nor requested by the players. See id. at 2130 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126 See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2130 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127 See id.
128 See id. Justice Stevens argued that this practice enabled a player to utilize the economic forces of a free and competitive market to determine his salary. See id. Justice
Stevens objected to eliminating this established practice solely because the developmental
squads were a new aspect of the league. See id. n.3.
129 See id. at 2130. Justice Stevens stated that the restraint was initially imposed to
force the owners to comply with the league's rule that limited a team's roster. See id. For
this reason, Justice Stevens observed that antitrust laws should govern because the owners' interest is competitive rather than regulatory. See id.
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ers "promptly and unequivocally" rejected any notion of fixed salaries,
and no bargaining over this issue occurred. 13 0

The dissent argued that the nonstatutory exemption allows emploxees, not employers, to act collectively and limit competition for wages.
Moreover, Justice Stevens maintained that professional football players
are entitled to the same antitrust protections afforded to other employees
directly harmed by concerted employer action. 13
Continuing, Justice Stevens steadfastly disagreed with the majority

opinion surrounding the theory that the players' only recourse to
"obviously offensive" restraints rests with the NLRB. 133

Specifically,

Justice Stevens proclaimed that the Supreme Court has always examined
the motives of a bargaining party before declining to apply the nonstatutory exemption. 1 4 Justice Stevens asserted that the current decision
contradicted United Mine Workers v. Pennington, noting that the Court
did not closely examine the underlying labor law policy justifying the exemption. 13- According to Justice Stevens, the Court had erroneously
created a new, expansive exemption by simply immunizing unilateral action if it occurred during the negotiating process and concerned a required bargaining subject. 36

130 See id.

Justice Stevens cited the letter from NFLPA representative Upshaw
that
articulated that no matter what salary was imposed--higher or lower--the new policy
contravened the settled principle allowing players to negotiate their individual salaries.
See id. n.4.
131 See Brown, 116 S. CL at 2131 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
132 See id. Justice Stevens opined that the Sherman Act should protect any
employee
who is directly harmed by a concerted employer agreement and whose bargaining position has been weakened, notwithstanding the fact that the union still exists. See id.
133 See id. Although Justice Stevens agreed that limiting a court's intervention is warranted under some circumstances, those courts were never intended to be completely
powerless to address egregious behavior. See id.
134 See id. at 2132 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that the Supreme
Court denied the defense of the nonstatutory exemption after specifically examining one
of the bargaining party's motives. See id. (citing United Mine Workers v. Pennington,
381 U.S. 657, 667 (1965)); see aLso supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text (discussing
Pennington in further detail). For this reason, the dissent disagreed with the majority's
decision to forbid antitrust courts from hearing labor-related conflicts. See Brown, 116 S.
Ct. at 2131 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
135 See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2132 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens was not
satisfied that the Pennington rule had not been met. See id. Conceding that the restraint
was encompassed in the bargaining process and related to a subject that had to be jointly
negotiated, Justice Stevens submitted that the same was true when the Court denied the
exemption in Pennington. See id. Lastly, Justice Stevens contended that the fourth
prong- concerned only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship"--could not
justify the exemption. See id.
See id. Justice Stevens complained that the majority neither used precedent to expand the limited exception nor explained its repudiation of Pennington. See id.
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Justice Stevens expressed that the majority excessively misplaced its
reliance on a concurring opinion in Jewel Tea.137 Specifically, Justice
Stevens speculated that Justice Goldberg's Jewel Tea concurrence did not
support the Court's present holding, which was evidenced by his personal
advocacy in a subsequent case involving professional sports. 138 The dissent reasoned that if the majority strictly followed Justice Goldberg's
views, antitrust courts would supplant the NLRB, which contradicts the
majority's holding. 1 39 Additionally, Justice Stevens emphasized that labor laws exist to promote collective bargaining and in parallel contexts,
the Court has not shielded employers from similar liability.
In concluding his opinion, Justice Stevens urged that Congress, not
the Supreme Court, possesses the authority to exempt anticompetitive
employer activity. 14 1 Lastly, Justice Stevens argued that the nonstatutory
exemption, which was created to protect employee action, would now act
as a hindrance to employees and force them to strike in order to retain
previously enjoyed rights. 142
137 See id.

The dissent noted that the Court cited Justice Goldberg's Jewel Tea con-

currence five times, yet the Jewel Tea majority simply dismissed it as too broad. See id.
The Broww Court's analysis, according to Justice Stevens, was misguided because Jewwl
Tea simply upheld the proposition that certain employer-union agreements are exempt.
See id. Rather, the Justice argued, the Court should have re-read the opinion in Jewel
Tea, which held that the effect on the market, not an agreement's form, should determine
whether the exemption applies. See id. at 2132-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens further observed that Justice Goldberg dissented in Pennington at a time when antitrust courts were permitted to scrutinize the bargaining process-the basis for the Court's
holding in the present case. See id. at 2133 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
138 See id. First, Justice Stevens clarified that Justice Goldberg's primary argument in
Jewel Tea was that antitrust law should not undermine a union's demands during a bargaining session. See id. In addition, the dissent reminded the majority that Justice Goldberg's opinions concerning the relationship between antitrust and labor law were more
clearly espoused when he represented a baseball player challenging the statutory exemption. See id. Justice Stevens stressed that Justice Goldberg, in his briefs to the Supreme
Court, asserted that baseball's reserve clause should not elude antitrust scrutiny because
"agreements between unions and nonlabor groups on hard-core restraints like 'pricefixing and market allocation' were not exempt." Id. (citation omitted). The exemption,
according to the Justice, was similarly inapplicable because the alleged scheme was in
place before collective bargaining became legal. See id. at 2134 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The importance of this, Justice Stevens stated, rested on the fact that the NFL created a
new restraint as opposed to preserving an old one. See id.
139 See id.
140 See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2134 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens proffered
that if the
situations,
141 See
142 See

Court truly believed that the NLRB's authority would be undermined in these
then the present holding would have been adopted long ago. See id.
id.
id. at 2134-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Citing the district court's opinion,

Justice Stevens quoted:
'Because the developmental squad salary provisions were a new concept... the policy behind continuing the nonstatutory labor exemp-
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While the Supreme Court overwhelmingly agreed that the nonstatutory labor exemption permits employers, upon an impasse in negotiations, to impose unilateral restraints on employees, the effect may potentially cripple the future process of collective bargaining. Ironically, part
of the Court's reasoning presumed that any judicial involvement would
foster additional instability and uncertainty. 3 The holding's practical
effect, however, ultimately will introduce even more confusion because
the Court did not enunciate firm guidelines or parameters.
By its own acknowledgment, the Court recognized that the nonstatutory exemption was initially created to protect employees through the
promotion of collective bargaining. 144 The decision, however, completely undermines that principle because it now allows employers to circumvent the collective bargaining process without suffering any consequences. Employers will implement whatever terms they desire so long
as they can assert that a good faith impasse in bargaining occurred.
The problem with Brown, though, is that identifying an impasse is
an extremely vague and subjective undertaking. The majority admits that
an impasse is often temporary and easily manipulated for leverage during
a bargaining session.
Furthermore, the majority admonished courts
for investigating an employer's actual intent and purpose. 146 For that
reason, it simply is not logical for the Court to immunize collective action at the point of impasse without assessing the party's intentions. The
exemption will now discourage, rather than promote, collective bargaining. Employers will be rewarded if they do not waiver or make concessions on controversial issues of employment contracts.
The Court rhetorically asked, "[W]hat are employers to do once an
impasse is reached?" 147 In the scope, context, and purpose of the limited
nonstatutory exemption, this question epitomizes the flaws of the Court's
holding. The majority appears to have either forgotten or discarded the
notion that the exemption was originally created to protect the employee
rather than the employer. The more appropriate question should have
tion... does not apply....

Mo

shield the NFL from antitrust liability

for imposing restraints never before agreed to by the union would not only
infringe on the union's freedom to contract, [ I but would also contradict
the very purpose of the antitrust exemption by not promoting execution of
a collective bargaining agreement with terms mutually acceptable to employer and labor union alike.'

See id. (quoting Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 125, 139 (D.D.C. 1991)
(citations omitted)).
143
144
145
146
147

See id. at 2123.
See id. at 2120.

See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2125.
See id.
Id. at 2122 (emphasis added).
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been, "What can the parties do once an impasse is reached?" The
Court, though, implies that its question should be resolved by the NLRB.
If no labor violation is found by the NLRB and the Supreme Court immunizes employers from antitrust liability, however, then management

will retain limitless power.
The Brown Court has in essence adopted the standard set forth by
the Eighth Circuit in Powell v. National Football League.148 The most
puzzling aspect of Brown is that the Court must have been aware of the
effect of Powell: the union was forced to decertify, and a flood of individual player lawsuits commenced. Surprisingly, though, Brown did not
cite Powell. It is apparent, however, that future litigants will be forced
to take similar action in order to circumvent the exemption's new and
broader scope.
In viewing the actual criteria set forth by the Court, it is questionable whether the facts of this case support the holding. Specifically,
Brown states that the conduct must involve "a matter that the parties
were required to negotiate collectively." 149 Developmental player squads
were never incorporated into a previous collective bargaining agreement
between the owners and the players' union. This was a new concept only
applicable to players not talented enough to make the real team. Having
already survived and excelled without developmental players, it is hard to
imagine the league suffering negative repercussions if this initiative failed
to garner union approval. For those reasons, the Court illogically con-

sidered this novel proposal as encompassing a mandatory subject of negotiation.
Lastly, the Court stated that the holding does not immunize all ac-

tions undertaken by employers. 150 The Court, though, does not define
where to draw the line on those "extreme outer boundaries." 151 Rather,
the Court willingly defers to the NLRB's judgment to determine whether
a violation has occurred. 52 The problem with such an approach is that

the Supreme Court created a limited exemption but now asks an independent third party to define its boundaries. Because the Supreme Court
created the nonstatutory exemption, it alone should retain the responsibility to explain and define its application. Without an established end-

point for the exemption, future litigants in all fields of collective bargaining will be forced to guess whether their actions are "sufficiently distant
148 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989). For further discussion of the Eighth Circuit Powell
opinion, see supra notes 87-90.
149 Brow, 116 S. Ct. at 2127.
15O See id.

151 See id.
152

See id.
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in time and in circumstances" as to avoid antitrust liability. 153 Considering that treble damages may be awarded if employers guess incorrectly,
the Court has created a standard that benefits no one.
Michael PepperNachman

153

See id.

